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Abstract 
The past decade has seen several large-scale policy initiatives against offshore tax evasion and policy 
activity is still hectic. The present paper reviews available data sources on household wealth in 
offshore jurisdictions, provides an overview of recent empirical results pertaining to offshore tax 
evasion as well as a discussion of the implications they have for current policy discussions. 
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1. Introduction 
The past decade has seen several large-scale policy initiatives against offshore tax evasion. Notably, 
the Savings Directive of the European Union introducing withholding taxes in tax havens and the push 
for international information exchange by the OECD and the G20 have caused fundamental changes in 
the environment where tax evaders operate. Policy activity in the field is still hectic. The EU countries 
are currently negotiating an amendment to the Savings Directive with the aim of closing certain 
specific loopholes; the UK and Germany are concluding individual treaties with Switzerland, which 
broaden the scope of the withholding taxes; and both OECD and developing countries are still signing 
information exchange treaties with tax havens at high frequency.  
The prolific policy activity, however, calls for thorough evaluation of the experiences with already 
implemented policy initiatives. While the study of offshore tax evasion is notoriously difficult due to 
the pervasive secrecy in offshore jurisdictions, recent empirical papers have made significant 
contributions to our understanding of the phenomenon. These contributions also offer important 
guidance to current policy process.  
The aim of the present paper is to provide an overview of the recent empirical results pertaining to 
offshore tax evasion as well as a discussion of the implications they have for current policy 
discussions. The paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 reviews available data sources on 
household wealth in offshore jurisdictions in order to establish the plausible magnitude of this “hidden 
wealth”. Section 3 describes the Savings Directive and presents existing studies of its effects, notably 
Johannesen (2011). Section 4 accounts for the recent wave of information exchange treaties with tax 
havens and presents the available empirical evidence, notably Johannesen and Zucman (2012). Section 
5 draws up lessons from the studies of offshore tax evasion and discusses implications for policy 
design. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Quantifying offshore wealth 
A natural first step in analyzing the fight against offshore tax evasion is to establish a notion of the 
size of the problem. The obvious challenge is that tax evasion is generally not directly observable – in 
the nature of things tax evaders might actually do their best to make it unobservable. Nevertheless, 
there are sources of information and techniques that have been used to back out plausible estimates of 
household wealth in tax havens. We will briefly review these sources in turn. It is useful to consider 
the two components of financial wealth, bank deposits and securities, separately.  
The Locational Banking Statistics of the Bank for International Settlements (the “BIS”) is a direct 
source of information on bank deposits in offshore jurisdictions. Notably, for 43 major international 
banking centers - including 19 tax havens - the BIS provides information on the total value of bank 
deposits owned by foreigners  and a decomposition on the residence countries of the foreign owners. 
The 19 tax havens are Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Chile, Cyprus, 
Guernsey, Hong-Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, Macao, Malaysia, Netherlands Antilles 
(now Curacao), Panama, Singapore and Switzerland. Hence, the BIS Locational Banking Statistics 
contain information on the value of bank deposits in Switzerland owned by UK residents, in 
Luxembourg owned by French residents, in Cayman Islands owned by US residents and so on.  
Table 1 displays the total value of banks deposits owned by foreigners in the 10 most important 
international banking centers (excluding bank deposits owned by other banks, which are unlikely to 
play a role in tax evasion). In 2011, foreign deposits in UK banks amounted to around USD 1,600 
billion, which made UK the largest international banking center in the world. Cayman Islands and 
Switzerland are the most important tax havens ranking third and fourth respectively, but also 
Singapore, Belgium and Hong Kong are among the 10 largest international banking centers. Across all 
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43 jurisdictions reporting to the BIS Locational Banking Statistics, foreign bank deposits amount to 
roughly USD 7,000 billion of which around USD 2,700 billion are placed in banks in the 19 tax 
havens listed above.  
Table 1: Foreign deposits in top-10 banking centers in 2011 (USD billion) 
United Kingdom  1,609 
United States  935 
Cayman Islands  635 
Switzerland  463 
Japan  404 
Netherlands  329 
Singapore  296 
Germany 290 
Belgium  217 
Hong Kong 204 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Locational Banking Statistics 
There is no comparable source of information on securities held through banks in tax havens. The 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey collected by the IMF includes some bilateral information 
about cross-border holdings of securities but, crucially, excludes the most important tax havens.  
Recently, however, Zucman (2011) has developed an ingenious method for estimating household 
portfolios of securities held through tax havens. The method essentially relies on inconsistencies in 
international portfolio statistics, which derive from the fact that assets are hidden from the tax 
authorities of the country of residence. Applying this method, it is found that households own 
portfolios of shares and bonds of around USD 4,500 billion in tax havens.  
In sum, the BIS Locational Banking Statistics provides direct evidence that the global value of 
bank deposits owned by households and firms in tax havens amounts to around USD 2,700 billion. 
There is no information on the split between households and firms, but drawing on more detailed 
Swiss data, Zucman (2011) conservatively estimates that roughly half, that is around USD 1,400 
billion, belong to households. Moreover, Zucman (2011) provides indirect evidence that the global 
value of shares and bonds owned by households through banks in tax havens amounts to around USD 
4,500 billion in 2011. Hence, a plausible estimate of global household offshore financial wealth is 
around USD 6,000 billion.  
3. The EU Savings Directive 
The Savings Directive aims to enable the member states of the European Union to tax the foreign 
interest income earned by households. It took effect on 1 July 2005 and initially covered the 25 EU 
member states as well as 15 non-EU jurisdictions including Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, Jersey, 
Guernsey and the Isle of Man. The EU enlargement on 1 January 2007 brought the number of 
participating jurisdictions to 42. 
The Savings Directive provides for two alternative types of international cooperation. The first type 
of cooperation is based on automatic information exchange: Banks report interest income earned by 
(foreign) EU resident households to their local tax authorities who, in turn, provide this information to 
the tax authorities of residence countries. The second type of cooperation is based on withholding 
taxes: Banks levy a tax on the interest income of (foreign) EU resident households and remit the 
revenue to their local tax authorities who, in turn, transfer 75% of the tax revenue to the tax authorities 
of the residence country without disclosing the identity of the tax payer. The withholding tax rate was 
initially 15% in 2005 but gradually increased to 20% in 2008 and 35% in 2011. While the majority of 
the EU member states opted for automatic information exchange, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg 
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as well as most of the participating jurisdictions outside the European Union adopted the withholding 
tax.  
It should be noted that the Savings Directive may be circumvented with relative ease in several 
ways (European Commission, 2008).  First, since only 18 of the more than 50 tax havens in the world 
participate in the Savings Directive, moving assets to a non-participating jurisdiction is a simple and 
effective strategy to circumvent the withholding tax. Second, the Savings Directive operates on an 
immediate ownership rather than a ultimate ownership basis, hence transferring the formal ownership 
of assets to a trust or a corporation in a non-participating jurisdiction allows tax evaders to fall outside 
its scope. Third, the Savings Directive applies only to interest income narrowly defined, which implies 
that letting structured finance products with returns linked to leading interest rates replace bank 
deposits effectively allow tax evaders to circumvent the withholding tax.  
Johannesen (2011) studies the impact of the Savings Directive on bank deposits in Switzerland, 
which is traditionally considered a primary destination for hidden wealth due to its strict banking 
secrecy rules and lack of commitments to international information exchange. The data are from the 
BIS Locational Banking Statistics described above.  
Methodologically, the paper exploits that the Savings Directive effectively taxes the Swiss source 
interest income of EU residents while leaving the Swiss source interest income of non-EU residents 
untaxed. The Swiss bank deposits of non-EU residents thus establishes a counterfactual for Swiss bank 
deposits of EU residents absent the Savings Directive, which allows for an estimate of the causal 
impact of Savings Directive on Swiss bank deposits.  
The paper finds that the Savings Directive reduced bank deposits in Switzerland owned by EU 
residents by more than 40%. To the extent that a significant share of Swiss bank deposits belong to 
firms, which are outside the scope of the Savings Directive and therefore presumably did not respond 
to it, the percentage reduction in Swiss deposits held by households is likely to have been even larger. 
Several patterns support the causal interpretation of this estimate. First, bank deposits owned by EU 
residents and non-EU resident followed strikingly similar time trends prior to 1 July 2005. This lends 
support to the notion that deposits owned by EU residents and non-EU resident would have followed 
similar time trends after to 1 July 2005 in the absence of the Savings Directive and, hence, that the 
observed divergence in time trends around 1 July 2005 is the causal effect of the Savings Directive. 
Second, most of the estimated reduction in Swiss bank deposits owned by EU residents occurred 
during just two quarters between 1 April 2005 and 30 September 2005. The close temporal association 
between the introduction of the tax and the drop in bank deposits clearly strengthens the case for a 
causal interpretation. Third, the result is robust to comparing the behavior of EU residents to a narrow 
group of comparable countries such as the remaining OECD countries. The direct comparison of 
highly similar countries makes it implausible that the sudden divergence in trends around 1 July 2005 
is due to other shocks than the Savings Directive with a strongly differential impact in EU countries 
and non-EU countries.  
The paper conducts a similar analysis for Luxembourg and Jersey, which are both tax havens 
applying a withholding tax under the Savings  Directive. The effects are slightly smaller and less 
precisely estimated but the overall picture is the same. The Savings Directive caused a very significant 
drop in bank deposits owned by EU residents in these countries.  
While Johannesen (2011) provides strong evidence that Savings  Directive caused a very 
significant drop in bank deposits owned by EU residents in Switzerland and other tax havens applying 
the 15% withholding tax, it does not provide a definitive answer to the equally interesting question: 
What happened to the funds that were removed from bank accounts in these countries?  
It seems implausible, however, that the drop in bank deposits in Switzerland reflects repatriation to 
the residence countries to any significant extent. First, all EU member states had considerably higher 
tax rates on interest income than the 15% withholding tax rate initially applied under the Savings 
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Directive. Hence, leaving wealth in tax havens was considerably more tax efficient than repatriation 
and implied no significant risk of detection. Second, participating tax havens generally  allowed 
households to avoid the withholding tax by accepting that information on interest income be 
automatically transmitted to their country of residence. It follows that repatriation was not necessary 
for tax evaders who desired to come clean while avoiding to pay the withholding tax.   
A much more likely explanation than repatriation is that tax evaders moved wealth to untaxed 
alternatives in response to the Savings Directive. As noted above, the Savings Directive in its current 
form contains several loopholes that allow tax evaders with assets in Switzerland to avoid the 
withholding tax with relative ease, e.g. moving assets to a non-participating jurisdiction, holding assets 
through a trust or a corporation in a non-participating jurisdiction or replacing bank deposits with 
exempt structured finance products with very similar characteristics.  
This conclusion is consistent with other complementary evidence on the effects of the Savings 
Directive. For instance, Klautke and Weichenreider (2010) study bonds market effects while 
exploiting that bonds issued prior to 2001 are outside the scope of the Savings Directive. The main 
finding is that exempt bonds are not associated with a lower pre-tax return than otherwise comparable 
taxable bonds suggesting that techniques allowing investors to avoid the provisions of the Savings 
Directive are readily available. 
4. Information Exchange Treaties 
For more than a decade, the OECD has promoted transparency in tax havens in the form of bilateral 
treaties providing for exchange of tax relevant information. Like the Savings Directive, the aim is to 
establish effective taxation of income earned in tax havens, but the approach is clearly distinct. 
Whereas the Savings Directive provides for anonymous taxation in tax havens and subsequent transfer 
of tax revenue to residence countries, the idea underlying the OECD transparency principle is that tax 
havens provide information that allow countries to enforce their own residence based capital taxes.  
The bilateral treaties promoted by the OECD build on a specific standard of information exchange 
known as information exchange upon request under which countries can solicit information about 
specific tax payers from the partner country. The practical use of this type of information exchange, 
however, is much contested. In order to place a request for information, countries need to document a 
suspicion against the specific tax payer about which information is requested. Obviously, this type of 
information is very difficult to come about, which suggests that from the perspective of tax evaders, 
the risk of detection is relatively small even when information exchange upon request is implemented 
and adequately enforced.  
For several years, the OECD efforts to promote information exchange treaties were largely 
fruitless. Some tax havens officially endorsed the transparency principle, but generally concluded very 
few treaties. Most major tax havens such as Switzerland, Luxembourg and Singapore objected 
strongly to the transparency principle itself and declined to engage in effective exchange of 
information.   
The turning point occurred at the G20 summit in London in April 2009. Against the backdrop of 
the financial crisis, a political determination emerged among the G20 countries to address the problem 
of offshore tax evasion. Tax havens were threatened with economic sanctions unless they implemented 
the OECD transparency standard – specified by the OECD to be at least 12 bilateral treaties providing 
for effective information exchange. In the rest of 2009, more than 300 information exchange 
agreements were concluded and the treaty signing activity remained high throughout 2010 and well 
into 2011.  
Johannesen and Zucman (2012) use deposit data from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics to 
evaluate the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown and report two main findings. First, the wave of information 
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exchange treaties since the G20 summit have not reduced the total value of bank deposits in tax 
havens. Second, the information exchange treaties have provoked a relatively small but statistically 
significant transfer of deposits from more compliant tax havens to less compliant tax havens. These 
findings make a rather dismal picture: To the extent that countries are concerned mainly with the 
overall scale of offshore tax evasion and not with the specific tax havens used by evaders, the G20 Tax 
Haven Crackdown is a failure.  
5. Lessons for policy making 
The Savings Directive amounts to a simple and easily interpretable natural experiment whereby the net 
return of a particular evasion strategy is reduced by 15% (i.e. deposits in Swiss banks held directly) 
whereas the net return of a number of alternative evasion strategies is unchanged (i.e. deposits in 
Singapore banks held directly; deposits in Swiss banks held indirectly through sham entities in third 
countries; and structured financial products held in Swiss banks). 
The analysis in Johannesen (2011) shows that the modest tax of 15% caused a large reduction in 
Swiss bank deposits of at least 40%. We previously argued that the behavioral response largely 
reflected substitution towards alternative evasion strategies. The more general lesson to draw from this 
finding seems to be the following: 
Lesson 1: Offshore tax evasion strategies are highly substitutable and evaders respond strongly to 
incentives 
The implication of this lesson is clearly that any partial policy measure against offshore tax evasion is 
very vulnerable to circumvention. For instance, the Savings Directive only targets tax evasion in 
certain tax havens and in the form of certain types of income (interest income defined narrowly). If tax 
evasion strategies are indeed highly substitutable, tax evaders respond to such a partial policy initiative 
by substituting towards tax havens and types of income, which are not targeted. This suggests that 
broadening the scope of the Savings Directive in terms of, for instance, the number of tax havens and 
the types of income covered, are crucial to make it effectively counter offshore tax evasion. The 
current proposal from the European Commission to amend the Savings Directive would address some 
but not all of these concerns.   
By comparison, information exchange treaties constitute a relatively broad policy measure against 
offshore tax evasion in the sense that they address all types of income (e.g. interest income, dividend 
income and capital gains) and look through holding structures involving sham entities in third 
countries. To the extent that treaty networks are incomplete, however, the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown 
suffers from the same deficiency as the Savings Directive, namely that only evasion in certain tax 
havens are targeted thus creating a scope for circumvention by substituting to non-targeted tax havens. 
The implication of Lesson 1 is that countries should endeavor to complete treaty networks in order to 
eliminate this scope for substitution. 
As reported above, the findings of Johannesen and Zucman (2012) suggest that the information 
exchange treaties caused relatively small transfers of funds from cooperative havens to less 
cooperative havens. The average response to the signing of an information exchange treaty in terms of 
transfers of funds to havens not covered by a treaty is considerably smaller than the average response 
to the 15% withholding tax under the Savings Directive. There are, in principle, two possible 
explanations for this pattern. First, due to the comparably broad scope of information exchange 
treaties, the set of available alternative evasion strategies is smaller than under the withholding tax, 
hence substitution to alternative evasion strategies is effectively limited on the supply side. Second, 
the increase in the probability of detection of tax evasion implied by the signing of a treaty is relatively 
small, hence substitution to alternative evasion strategies is limited on the supply side. The latter 
explanation appears much more plausible than the former. Offshore wealth is concentrated on 
relatively few, wealthy individuals and it therefore seems highly unlikely that the transactions costs 
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associated with a transfer of funds from one tax haven to another would be prohibitive. More likely, 
treaties are not perceived to involve a serious risk of detection, which is consistent with the fact that 
countries generally request information under their treaties quite infrequently. This discussion is 
summarized in Lesson 2.  
Lesson 2: Information exchange upon request implies a relatively small increase in the probability of 
detection.  
The policy implication of Lesson 2 is that treaties should be made more demanding. Ideally, treaties 
would provide for automatic information exchange whereby treaty partners would systematically and 
periodically exchange information about the income of residents of the partner country. This type of 
information exchange is currently practiced between most member states of the European Union.  
An interesting policy debate concerns the question whether withholding taxes (as implemented 
under the Savings Directive) or information exchange (as implemented under the G20 Tax Haven 
Crackdown) is a preferable instrument to combat offshore tax evasion. The empirical findings 
presented in this paper do not provide an unequivocal answer to this question. Rather, it seems that 
both withholding taxes and information exchange, in their current form, suffer from serious 
weaknesses that allow for large-sale evasion, but that both could, potentially, take a form that would 
effectively end offshore tax evasion. Specifically, a withholding tax applied in all of the world’s tax 
havens to all types of income seems, for most practical purposes, to achieve the same ends as a 
comprehensive, multilateral agreement on automatic information exchange.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper has discussed available empirical evidence on the behavioral responses to recent large-
scale policy initiatives against offshore tax evasion and has drawn conclusions for future policy 
making. Most importantly, the empirical evidence shows that offshore tax evasion strategies are highly 
substitutable, which makes partial policy initiatives addressing only a subset of the alternative evasion 
strategies particularly vulnerable to circumvention. Moreover, the current form of information 
exchange does not seem to imply a large increase in the probability of detecting offshore tax evasion. 
A withholding tax on all types of income applied in all tax havens and a multilateral agreement on 
automatic information exchange offer themselves as alternative solutions that would effectively put an 
end to offshore tax evasion.  
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